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uccessor liability is
an exception to the
general rule that,
when one corporate entity sells
assets to another
entity, the assets are transferred free and clear of all
but valid liens and security
interests. When successor
liability is imposed, a creditor or plaintiff with a claim
against the seller may assert
that claim against and collect
payment from the purchaser.
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Historically, successor liability was
a flexible doctrine, designed to eliminate the harsh results that could
attend strict application of corporate
law. Over time, however, as successor
liability doctrines evolved in many
jurisdictions they became ossified and
lacking in flexibility. As this occurred,
those who structure transactions
learned how to avoid application of
successor liability doctrines. See
George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and
Evaluation of Successor Liability, 3
Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 1 (2006).
The current judge-made successor
liability law is a product of and reaction to the rise of corporate law in
the last half of the 19th century and
early part of the 20th century. It may
be better to characterize it as a part
of that body of law, much like the
"alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil" doctrines, rather than as a
creature of tort law, although it is
used as a tool by plaintiffs who are
involuntary tort claimants.
Many authorities list four, five, or six
basic types of situations in which
judge-made successor liability has
sometimes been recognized - (1)
express-or implied assumption, (2)
fraud, (3) de facto merger, (4) mere continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise,
and (6) product line, for example. In
fact, the matter is more complicated.
Each of these species of successor liability has, within it, different sub-species
with different standards and variations
in the jurisdictions that recognize them.
Some use a list of mandatory elements
while others are based on a non-exclusive list of factors and considerations to
be weighed and balanced in a "totality
of the circumstances" fashion. Some
that began as an approach consisting of
a flexible list of factors have evolved
into one consisting of one or more
mandatory elements.
When examining successor liability,
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keep in mind that there-is variance
between formulations in particular
jurisdictions. The label a court uses for
its test is not necessarily one with a
standardized meaning. It is dangerous
to place too much reliance on a name;
the underlying substance should
always be examined.

The State of Successor
Liability in Maryland
A. Intentional (Express or Implied)
Assumption of Liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities, express or implied, is probably
the simplest of the successor liability
species. Imposing liability on a successor that, by its actions, is shown to
have assumed those liabilities is
essentially an exercise in contract construction and interpretation.
The Maryland courts look to the language of the asset purchase agreement
to determine in the purchasing corporation expressly assumed the liabilities
of the seller. Unlike most jurisdictions,
Maryland has explicitly acknowledged
a standard to determine if the purchaser impliedly assumed the liabilities of
the seller. In Baltimore Luggage Co. v.
Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1292 (Md. Ct.
App. 1992), the court said:
In order for a promise to be
implied on the part of a corporation to pay the debts of another
corporation, the conduct or representations relied upon by the
party asserting liability must
indicate an intention of the buyer
to pay the debts of the seller. The
presence of such an intention
depends on the facts and circum-

chaser continued to pay the employee
salary and report his earnings on a W-2
because the purchaser deducted these
payments from the amount that the
purchaser paid for the seller's assets.
B. Fraudulent Schemes to Escape
Liability
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using corporate law limitation-ofliability principles to defeat the
legitimate interests of creditors illustrate an example of the need for successor liability to prevent injustice. If a
corporation's equity holders, for example, arrange for the company's assets to
be sold to a new company in which
they also hold an equity or other stake
for less value than would be produced
if the assets were deployed by the original company in the ordinary course of
business, then the legitimate interests
and expectations of the company's
creditors have been frustrated. Nissen
Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d
564 (Md. 1990). By allowing liability to
attach to the successor corporation in
such instances, the creditors' interests
and expectations are respected. The
challenge, is defining the standard that
separates the fraudulent scheme from
the legitimate one.
As the Nissen court stated, the fraud
exception is embodied in the Maryland
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
There are apparently no Maryland
cases that apply the fraud species of
successor liability independent from a
fraudulent conveyance theory.

The Baltimore Luggage court, applying this test, held that a purchasing corporation did not impliedly assume an

C. De Facto Merger
In a statutory merger, the successor
corporation becomes liable for the predecessor's debts. The de facto merger
species of successor liability creates the
same result in the asset sale context to
avoid allowing form to overcome substance. A de facto merger, then, allows

employment contract where the pur-

liability to attach when an asset sale has

stances of each case.

mimicked the results of a statutory
merger except for the continuity of liability. The main difference between the
sub-species of de facto merger in various jurisdictions is how rigid or flexible
the test is. In other words, how many
required elements must be shown to
establish applicability of the doctrine?
On one end of the spectrum is the
lengthy, mandatory checklist of
required elements. On the other, the
non-exclusive list of factors to be
weighed in a totality of the circumstances fashion.
As the Nissen court indicated, the de
facto merger exception is codified in
Statute.
Corporation
Maryland's
Although the Maryland Annotated
Code does not use de facto merger
ANN.,
language,
MD.
CODE
Corporations and Associations '3114(e)(1) does provide that the surviving entity in a merger situation is liable
for the debts of the predecessor and
does not specify that such liability only
extends to statutory mergers. The
courts have not yet defined a test for
what might constitute a de facto merger
under Maryland law.

gether careful or uniform in labeling
which exception they are applying. The
similarity of these doctrines to those of
defacto merger is striking.
1. Mere Continuation
The Baltimore Luggage court provided a test for whether a purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation
of the seller:
[A] successor corporation may be
liable for the debts of its predecessor if certain indicia are met.
The indicia of continuation are:
"common officers, directors, and
stockholders; and only one corporation in existence after the
completion of the sale of assets.
While the two foregoing factors
are traditionally indications of a
continuing corporation, neither is
essential. Other factors such as
continuation of the seller's business practices and policies and
the sufficiency of consideration
running to the seller corporation
in light of the assets being sold
may also be considered. To find
that continuity exists merely
because there was common management and ownership without
considering other factors is to disregard the separate identities of
the corporation without the necessary considerations that justify
such an action."

ity of ownership between the corporations, the seller remained in existence,
and there was sufficient consideration
for the assets.
It is important to note that neither of
the mere continuation tests applied by
the Maryland courts requires continuity of ownership. The Baltimore Luggage
court, however, noted that mere continuation applies where "the purchasing
corporation maintains the same or similar management and ownership but
wears a 'new hat."' 594 A.2d at 1292. In
discussing the four traditional exceptions, the Nissen court cited this quote
from Baltimore Luggage with approval.
594 A.2d at 566. Based on the current
case law, it is hard to tell what degree of
continuity is actually required before a
court will impose liability based on the
mere continuation doctrine.

D. Continuation of the Business:
The Continuity Exceptions
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor liability
when the successor continues the business of the seller: mere continuation
and continuity of enterprise. Each has
sub-species particular to specific jurisdictions within them. The two share
roughly the same indications, but continuity of enterprise does not require
continuity of shareholders or directors
or officers between the predecessor and
the successor. That requirement said to
be one of the "mere continuation"
elements
exception' s
dispositive
or factors. MD. CODE ANN.,
Corporations and Associations '3-114(e)(1)

Id. at 1293. In Baltimore Luggage, the
trial court held that the purchaser was
a mere continuation of the seller based
on evidence that the purchaser continued to use the trade name of the seller
and held itself out as the seller so that
persons dealing with the purchaser
would not know that the corporations
changed. The Court of Special Appeals

2. Continuity of Enterprise
Unlike the more traditional and long
standing "mere continuation" exception, the continuity of enterprise theory
does not require strict continuity of
shareholders or owners (and possibly
directors and officers) between the
predecessor and the successoralthough the degree or extent of continuity of owners, directors and officers
is a factor. Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp.,
752 E2d 168 174-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the traditional mere continuation exception requires identity of
stockholders, directors and officers); see
also Savage Arms Inc. v. Western Auto
Supply, 18 P.2d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001)
(mere continuation theory requires
"the existence of identical shareholders"). Further,continuity of enterprise
generally does not include the requirement of dissolution of the predecessor
upon or soon after the sale, which is
often a factor-and sometimes a
requirement-in jurisdictions applying
the mere continuation doctrine.

(1998). Nationally, courts are not alto-

reversed because there was no continu-

A detailed examination of continuity
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of enterprise in the jurisdictions that
have adopted it discloses three subspecies at work, all variations of the
continuity of enterprise exception from
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co. 244
N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). The Turner
factors are:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is a continuity
of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general
business operations;
(2) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves
as soon as legally and practically possible; and
(3) The purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the interrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the
seller corporation.

offending product."
Maryland courts have not adopted
the continuity of enterprise doctrine.
E. The Product Line Exception of
Ray v. Alad
In Ray v. Alad, 560 P2d 3 (Cal. 1977),
the California Supreme Court recognized the product line exception to the
general rule of successor non-liability.
It is a very similar to continuity of
enterprise. The court articulated the
following "justifications" for imposing
liability on a successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the
plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by
the successor's acquisition of the
business, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that
was
a burden necessarily
attached to the original manufacturer's goodwill being enjoyed
by the successor in the continued
operation of the business.

merely one of many product lines
from the predecessor. In nearly all
reported cases, it appears to have
been applied to sales of substantially
all of a predecessor's assets. George
W. Kuney & Donna C. Looper,
Successor Liability in California, 20
CEB Cal. Bus. L. Pract. 50 (2005). In
fact, one court has emphasized that
the "policy justifications for our
adopting the product line rule
require the transfer of substantially
all of the predecessor's assets to the
successor corporation." Hall v.
Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d
258, 260 n.1 (1984) (refusing to apply
product line test to successor that
purchased but one of many asbestos
product lines).
The product line doctrine, where
accepted, breaks into two distinct subspecies. The two differ only as to
whether Ray's "virtual destruction of
the plaintiff's [other] remedies" condition is strictly required in order to
permit recovery.
Maryland courts have not adopted
the product line doctrine.

Conclusion

In Foster v. Cone Blanchard Mach.
Co., 597 N.W. 2d 506 (Mich. 1999), the
Foster court clarified the rule of Turner
as one consisting of these three
required elements.
Second, the Foster court held that the
"'continuity of enterprise' doctrine
applies only when the transferor is no
longer viable and capable of being
sued." The court's interpretation of the
underlying rationale of Turner was "to
provide a source of recovery for injured
plaintiffs." The Turner court expanded
liability based on the successor's continued enjoyment of "certain continuing benefits": "[Tihe test in Turner is
designed to determine whether the
company (or enterprise) involved in
the lawsuit is essentially the same corn-

The term "justifications" is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it
connotes required elements or nonexclusive factors to be balanced, much
like the Turner guidelines.
The California Supreme Court
returned to Ray v. Alad some years
later to "clarify" things. In Henkel
Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co.,
62 R.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003), the
California Supreme Court referred to
these three justifications as conditions, thus suggesting that they were
essential elements under the product
line exception. Despite its name, the
product line theory of successor liability appears only rarely, if at all, to

This article attempts to detail some
of the history and the current condition of successor liability law in
Maryland in light of the national state
of these doctrines. The purpose of the
doctrines was to provide contract and
tort creditors with an avenue of recovery against a successor entity in appropriate cases when the predecessor that
contracted with them or committed
the tort or the action that later gave rise
to the tort had sold substantially all of
its assets and was no longer a viable
source of recovery. The doctrine is in
the nature of an "equitable" doctrine.
It is invoked when strict application of
corporate law would offend the conscience of the court. In large part, the

pany that was allegedly negligent in
designing or manufacturing the

have been applied in a reported decision to a successor that had acquired

doctrine remains intact and still serves
that purpose.
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